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In this article we place the discussions of automation in post-work imaginaries within 
and alongside feminist critiques and understandings of domestic technology. 
Structured in three parts, the first surveys debates on the future of work, showing 
how feminist materialist critiques of technology would lend itself to an anti-work 
rather than post-work politics. The second focuses on both historical and 
contemporary feminist critiques of domestic automation to situate the post-work 
condition in this longer lineage. In the final section, we sketch the contours of a 
distinctly feminist anti-work imaginary drawing on Dolores Hayden’s work on 
collective domestic settlements and Rachel Maine’s work on amateur uses and 
repurposing of obsolete technologies in the name of a politics of pleasure.  
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In this article, we interrogate recent debates on post-work, considering how a 
significant part of the recent scenarios speculating around the impact of full 
automation and the coming of a post-work society rely on particular assumptions or 
understandings about the relationship of work to technology. In many of the current 
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discussions around post-work, we find the analysis of the domestic realm to be 
lacking and speculations around how it could be possible to dismantle and move 
beyond the current shape and functions ascribed to the family as a standard are 
often insufficient. However, accounting for the unpaid work that goes on at home and 
in the community has long been a focal point of attack of feminist critics. The relation 
between the status of work between capital and domestic life has always been a 
crucial point of struggles for feminist movements, a point that exploded again in the 
1970s, as feminists began to trace the connections and interdependencies between 
exploitation in the factories and hierarchies at home and in the community (such as 
in the well-known case of the transnational campaign Wages for Housework).1 
 
As the notions of ‘separate spheres’ became challenged, domestic technologies 
began to be understood as implicated in practices of production, reproduction and 
consumption.  In relation to post-work scenarios, we therefore find it important to turn 
to feminist critiques of domestic technologies which have, in multiple ways, 
dismantled some of the fantasies that technology was meant to bring. They lend an 
historical depth to contemporary post-work debates, in ways that might help avoid 
the blind-spots or received notions that have already been debunked.  
 
In this article we place the discussions of automation in post-work imaginaries within 
and alongside feminist critiques and understandings of domestic technology. We 
open with a survey of current debates on the future of work, showing how feminist 
materialist critiques of technology would lend itself rather to an anti-work rather than 
post-work politics, following Kathi Weeks.2 Via this survey, we point to the specific 
contribution of Marxist feminist debates that critically linked the conditions of work 
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outside a wage-relation with the unpaid, invisibilised labour that is naturalised in the 
home, bringing a more nuanced standpoint from which to situate the role of 
technologies.  
 
The second section traces on both historical and contemporary feminist critiques of 
domestic automation, culminating in the “smart home”.  Such critique helps to situate 
the post-digital and post-work condition within a in the longer lineage of the 
development of ‘automatic’ devices or appliances in the home, such as the automatic 
washing machine. This latter type of device and its contemporaries are well 
documented and analysed by feminist scholars, who we draw on here. 
 
In this section we bring together a range of perspectives from different disciplines, 
such as history STS, architecture, sociology and political theory, which could all be 
considered feminist insomuch as they make gender and class at the centre of their 
analysis. However, these scholars do not represent a homogenous feminist school of 
thought nor a single view, as it is always the case for feminisms, but they share 
some important points of convergence about the relationship between technologies 
and work from which we depart in order to challenge some of the tenets of the 
current post-work discourses. Taken together, such feminist perspectives on 
domestic technologies invite a deeper reflection around the double tie that links the 
realm of working life with its counterparts, variously conceptualised as private / 
public, home / factory, production / social reproduction, work / rest, and so on. 
 
What these works also share is the moment in which they were authored. In Anglo-
American scholarship particularly, in a period of about fifteen years, roughly between 
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1975 and 1990, many publications were put forward that revealed a growing 
attention towards domestic practices as a prolific site of political enquiry around 
questions to do with the division of labour and how the myths of progress impacted 
gender roles specifically as they realised themselves throughout the unfolding of the 
modern industrial era. While these authors did not speak about ‘agency’, we feel this 
term could be utilised to capture what was at stake in these debates: what were 
technologies doing in terms of transforming relationships at home and with the 
home? What was not explicitly foregrounded in these conversations was the role 
played by racialisation in such dynamics, which are thankfully becoming much more 
prominent now, especially in relation to algorithmic racism and new forms of 
technological discrimination, as well as invisibilised labour in outsources platforms 
for domestic work for hire or delocalised call-centres, and also across researches 
focusing on the human and ecological impact of the production and disposal of 
hardware in the context of extractivist globalised operation and new forms of 
colonialism.   
 
Given the historical production of the divisions of paid/ un-paid, productive/ un or re-
productive labour, the case of the domestic and domestic technologies complicates 
any assumption that technology might be inherently emancipatory. Similarly, those 
technologies complicate the perspective that the home is somehow a site that is 
autonomous from capital and that emancipation from work can take place without 
revisiting the organisation of social metabolism, reproduction and the redistribution of 
its responsibilities as made possible by specific technical imaginaries. Following 
Kathi Weeks, we suggest that in order to criticize and debunk the myth of work one 
must also reconsider the family in parallel.3 In the third and final section, we 
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therefore take automation and domesticity as two central concepts to sketch the 
contours of a distinctly feminist anti-work imaginary. Here we draw on Dolores 
Hayden’s work on alternative collective domestic settlements and the different forms 
of technologies that they developed.4 We take this alongside Rachel Maine’s work 
on amateur uses and repurposing of obsolete technologies in the name of a politics 
of pleasure.5 This helps to refocus the attention given to automation in its role, not so 
much as a tool for production, but rather seen as providing an infrastructure of an 
emancipatory social reproduction.  
 
THE FUTURE OF WORK  
 
The future of work, or better yet, its demise due to the growth of available automated 
processes, has become a topic of enormous political interest in recent years. The 
projection data are indeed powerful: according to the different methodologies used, 
most reports speak of a minimum loss of 10%6 up to a maximum close to 50%7 of all 
jobs in the next decades; and these calculations become more impactful if we take 
into account that entire industries that could disappear as a secondary consequence 
of automation.8 Post-work society has become somewhat of a fashionable 
expression to sum up the eventuality of such epochal changes, but perhaps its 
popularity is due precisely to the fact that this term conjures up a vast array of 
imaginaries about the near future without revealing too much of the politics and 
values lying at their core. The post-work scenarios in circulation range from the 
dystopian vision of a world marked by extreme inequalities and total government of 
lives, to more optimistic proposals based on a fully automated luxury communism 
and the possibility of a universal basic income.  
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On the one hand we have an interest in post-work coming from the capitalist position 
of those belonging to what McKenzie Wark names the ‘vectorialist class,’9 those who 
are ruling over the informational infrastructure of the present. This position can be 
well represented through the various bombastic declarations of the likes of Mark 
Zuckerberg (CEO of Facebook), Richard Branson (CEO of Virgin) and Elon Musk 
(CEO of Tesla), top exponents of the vectorialist class recently converted to the idea 
of some kind of basic income.10 
 
The key protagonist found in the reflections of these billionaires is technology itself, 
via the advent of mass automation, made possible by more efficient artificial 
intelligences and by algorithmic predictions applied to management. Here, it is the 
machine that is at the centre, and a resulting society freed from work emerges as a 
problematic reality to be managed, either with ‘the carrot or the stick’. What do you 
do with it, what is redundant humanity for, too, once this can no longer be valued as 
a "reserve army" of the unemployed, ask Zuckerberg, Branson, Musk (and their 
many acolytes)? And so, the various basic income models advocated for by these 
entrepreneurs also share the specific trait of maintaining the idea of a quantifiable 
performance, subjected to metrics, in exchange for a basic sustenance is at the 
centre of their paradigm. The sphere of non-remunerated labour is ultimately 
expanded, encouraging and accelerating the mutation of welfare systems into 
workfare ones, where compulsory unpaid work is required in order to gain access to 
subsidies. These are the imaginaries brewing among the (well-meaning and 
unaware, sometimes) accelerationist right: a societal re-design where technologists 
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get to shape the very values and life choices of everyone, at an unprecedented level. 
In a 2013 TED Talk, economist Andrew McAfee enthusiastically reported how:  
 
When I talk about this with my friends in Cambridge and Silicon Valley, they 
say, ‘Fantastic. No more drudgery, no more toil. This gives us the chance to 
imagine an entirely different kind of society, a society where the creators and 
the discoverers and the performers and the innovators come together with 
their patrons and their financiers to talk about issues, entertain, enlighten, 
provoke each other.’ It's a society really, that looks a lot like the TED 
Conference.11 
 
 Echoed a few years later by another TED talker addressing post-work:  
  
Suppose you know that at some point in the future, no matter what, you're 
going to get the same basic income as everyone else. Now, to my mind, that 
creates a very perverse incentive for you to simply give up and drop out of 
school. So I would say, let's not structure things that way. Instead, let's pay 
people who graduate from high school somewhat more than those who simply 
drop out.12 
 
The idea that machines will free us from an economy of scarcity is an old trope in 
political conservative thinking, found for instance in Alvin Tofler’s Future Shock of 
1970,13 or in the Triple Revolution report, delivered to President Lyndon Johnson in 
March 1964.14 But one that, we would argue, misses the mark on many levels by 
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misinterpreting the scarcity of jobs in the economy as a problem of productivity, 
rather than one of redistribution of wealth, division of labour, violence and power.  
 
This is the situation on the right end of the spectrum. But what about the imaginaries 
circulating in more progressive debates, positioned on the left and dedicated to an 
idea of post-work becoming a chance for furthering social justice? Here, the post-
work hypothesis in circulation can be grouped mainly in two types, which can be 
summarised as full automation and full autonomy.  
 
The first, ‘full automation’ has been perhaps best captured by the sentence Fully 
Automated Luxury Communism, which was indeed circulated as a meme amongst 
the UK radical left before it became the title of an article by Aaron Bastani, recently 
turned into a book;15 but it is also found in Srnicek and Williams’ Inventing the future: 
Postcapitalism and a world without work,16 among others. Here, automation and 
ecologically sustainable technologies make it possible to surpass the scarcity of 
capitalist austerity and transport us in the unbounded space of abundance economy. 
In this scenario, the common intelligence of the general intellect would become a 
networked entity of extreme sophistication that would be able to take care of 
satisfying the enormous variations of needs and desires that traverse the social 
body.  
 
This version has the merit of placing the emphasis on the richness of possibilities 
that come with the all too human capacity of embedding knowledge in automatons 
and machines that could finally enable our species-being to transform many of the 
burdens currently linked with toiling for social reproduction. Moreover, they have the 
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merit of emphasizing the nonetheless social and interconnected nature of life after 
work, thus giving an incentive to complicate the vision of small utopian and happy 
municipalities from which they would immediately want to escape. In this sense, this 
machinic imaginary of luxury avoids a certain nostalgia for a return to a simple and 
frugal life in a small, idyllic communities that fascinates many on the left, an image 
that could lend itself to easy superimpositions with fantasies of a much more far-right 
flavour, however, as demonstrated by the current rise of eco-fascist initiatives and 
worldviews.17 The problem however, remains that by positing plentiful consumption 
as ‘the’ alternative to work, we risk forgetting how much of this consumption is also a 
kind of work in the present moment, a work of consumption, acquisition and 
prosumption fully enmeshed in capital exchanges. The metabolic needs of a society 
that equates luxury with access to automated consumption paths would be, given the 
current technological infrastructure, astronomical and unsustainable not only 
ecologically, but perhaps also psychically and affectively.  
 
On the other hand, we find a second family of imaginaries that, rather than focussing 
on automation, emphasises a post-work scenario based on what we call ‘full 
autonomy’. This can be found in the literature connected more directly from a famous 
expression that Marx and Engels outlined in the German Ideology, as they briefly 
sketched how life could look like in realised communism: 
 
For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a 
particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from 
which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a 
critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of 
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livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive 
sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he 
wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible 
for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, 
fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I 
have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.18   
 
Here, as in other more contemporary version of this kind of convivial frugality for 
instance found in David Frayne’s The Refusal of Work, the imagined organizational 
blueprint is based upon a combination of self-organized sustenance activities (such 
as rearing cattle) and intellectually stimulating endeavours (such as critiquing after 
dinner).19 The merit of this second kind of post-work imaginary is that it avoids 
another popular left-wing nostalgia for a return to the welfare state or a Keynesian 
economic model, hinting towards a more autonomously managed social landscape. 
However, there are at least two different problematic aspects at play in this proposal. 
One is the danger of assigning value to those activities that are still recognizable as 
‘useful’ in a rather classic sense as found in the protestant ethics, on the one hand; 
and the second has to do with the fantasy of self-sufficiency as something that can 
open the door to images of self-managed communities organised in self-contained 
productive estates, thus once again resembling a right-wing idea of a big society 
organized around an industrious oikos.  
 
Both of the scenarios outlined above tend to assume rather than unpack the 
concepts of automation and of the private biography as the site of autonomy, relying 
on fantasies that we can debunk. When opening the door of the private sphere, 
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where the exercise of luxurious consumption or autonomous activities would occur, 
the imaginary fall short of exposing the impact of a refusal of work upon a 
transfigured “domestics.”20 Whether one speculates on the technological drive of 
automating more and more functions of the living, or whether one emphasizes 
autonomy as a kind of spontaneity of intentions and passions, what is missing here 
in these two dominants keys used in popular left discourses is a theory of how to 
think of economics as a deeply libidinal issue that is implicated in questions of 
intimacy, interdependence and reciprocity, as much as of autonomy and volition.  
 
In other words, there is no sophisticated vision of consumption and use that can 
accompany and support the overcoming of work conceived as a rejection of 
relationships dictated by capital. We suspect that one reason for this blind spot in 
recent conversations around the end of work might be due to the fact that many 
post-work scenarios developed out from a conception of automation as a process 
that mainly impacts the sphere of processes that are already identified as 
‘productive’ in a capitalist sense, that is, as immediately able to generate a profit.  
However, there is another line of thought, that of the rejection of work, elaborated 
mainly in the context of the two different political experiences of autonomist Marxism 
and materialist feminism, which unlike the post-work discourse does not imagine the 
question in terms of overcoming (post-), but maintains political action at the centre of 
the thinking of the two terms of the question: that is, decentralizing technology as a 
locus of emancipation and denaturalising work as a remunerated service, develops 
critical insights and practices that would be most aptly defined as anti-work.  
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There are important differences between the premises from which the speculations 
related to a post-work and anti-work society take shape. To challenge the post-work 
in a Silicon Valley style techno-solutionist key, the rejection of work needs both the 
thought of autonomous Marxism and that of materialist feminism. Paraphrasing an 
important concept exhibited by Kathi Weeks, the destruction of the myth of work 
requires an equally intense criticism of the normalized domestic sphere, of the 
family, at the idea of private life.21 To do this means, in the first analysis, to dismantle 
the idea that the technological problem is a problem only relevant to production and 
that instead personal relationships are an ambit of impulses desires and immediate 
or "natural" interlacements. In this sense, some analytical tools that come from the 
critical feminist debate around technologies and home automation can help us avoid 
the impasses linked to a policy of full automation that fails to focus on collective 




CRITIQUES OF DOMESTIC AUTOMATION  
 
One of the primary assumptions in post-work scenarios, the belief that technology is 
inherently ‘labour-saving’, is problematised when turning to the pioneering work of 
the historian Ruth Schwartz Cowan, who, writing in the 1980s, demonstrated that 
technological innovations for the home in the 1800s and 1900s United States were 
not ‘labour-saving’ but rather that domestic technologies reorganised work processes 
in such ways that reduced work for some, and increased work for others (impacting 
women, working class, and men and women of colour especially).22 While machines 
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did much to alleviate the so called ‘servant problem’ for those families who hired 
domestic help, it is important to highlight that the introduction of new technologies did 
not provoke what they termed the crisis of servants. In keeping with the anti-work 
hypothesis, the introduction of domestic machines could instead be seen as a 
consequence of a growing resistance of working class men and women to enter into 
service, as this was a form of life that was miserable and isolating, preferring instead 
to take on other kinds of paid work.23 In charting emerging innovations in domestic 
technologies Schwartz Cowan demonstrates how they in fact gave rise to new types 
of work (such as consumption work) and significantly brought more work for women. 
Schwartz Cowan, and others like the sociologist Elizabeth Shove, clearly 
demonstrated that while domestic technologies did remove ‘drudgery’ and the 
physical toil of household labour, domestic innovations were accompanied with 
greater expectations about what that work should deliver.24  The coal powered stove, 
for instance, Schwartz Cowan argues, ultimately meant that more than one dish 
could (and therefore should) be cooked at once, or technologies like the car, resulted 
in an increase of the labour that enables consumption.25  
 
Another insight feminist scholarship lends is that not only technological ‘labour-
saving’ innovations increase work but significantly do so in uneven ways, which 
coincide with and reinforce gender, race and class inequalities. In her research on 
city of Pittsburgh, historian Susan J. Kleinberg explains the ways that domestic 
technologies, such as running water, were not extended to working class women, 
who were tied to older, more laborious methods of doing housework.26 They had no 
capital to invest nor any income independent of their husband (who did not value 
these devices), which was compounded by a lack of municipal technologies and the 
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wider urban conditions in which they lived, in a poor neighbourhood with increased 
industry, pollution, no paving, no sewage, no water infrastructure making it harder for 
those working class women to keep their houses clean and increasing their work 
burden.27 Namely those women who would have most befitted from those 
technologies did not have access to it, but were subjected to more and harder 
work.28 
 
As sociologist Elizabeth Shove more recently proposed, consumer goods and 
domestic technologies never operate in isolation, but are integrated, or ‘cohere’:  
 
relatively little has been written about how suites of technologies and products 
are used together and how they cohere, socio-technically and symbolically, in 
shaping the meaning of what it is to be comfortable or to keep oneself and 
one's clothes appropriately clean.  This theme of integration proves to be 
especially important when thinking about the temporal coordination of 
everyday life and the self-fulfilling dynamic of the endless pursuit of 
convenience.29  
 
This theme of integration it seems to us a crucial one to focus on for future research 
into post-work scenarios, as it challenges any easy assumption around the possibility 
of simply converting existing infrastructures for different anti-work living.30 As 
Schwartz Cowan noted, the perception that the technologies which come to be 
dominant and prevalent in everyday life are so because of their technical excellence 
(a kind of technological Darwinism, if one likes, presupposing the survival of the 
fittest or most performative technologies as the sole factor at play in their societal 
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adoption) does not bear out when studying the practices of those objects design and 
manufacture. One of the most famous insights of her book, emerges from her 
examination of some of the technologies that ‘didn’t make it’, died out, or for a variety 
of reasons became untenable for its users, including the ‘death’ of the gas 
refrigerator in favour of the electric one.  In the development of the electric and the 
gas domestic refrigerators each experienced comparable technical problems, yet 
according to Schwartz Cowan the gas refrigerator had considerable advantages to 
the consumer, being cheaper to make, cheaper to run, quieter to run, and cheaper to 
maintain as it had no moving parts that would break down.31 Yet the electric one 
won, not because it was the better product or had more potential, but because of the 
considerable sums invested in its development, provided by General Electric who 
were keen, not only to sell refrigerators, but through those products and other 
household appliances, increase the regular sale of electricity to every household.32 In 
describing the emergence of household technologies as co-emerging with 
infrastructures, relying on the development of national power grids and domestic 
wiring, sockets and so on being commonplace, Kleinberg, Schwartz Cowan and 
Shove thus show the wider lesson is that domestic technologies do not ‘get rid’ of 
work and housework in and of themselves, but by creating new demands, new 
standards and new inequalities they tie users ever more into (wage) dependence, 
both through the consumption of objects and devices as well as to the costs levied to 
enable access to the infrastructure they depend on.  All of which, as Shove argued, 
are enmeshed in evolving standards and practices that particularly give rise to 
increased consumption and intensifying uses of environmental resources.33 
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A third insight coming from a feminist perspective, revolves around the recognition 
and problematization of the ways in which domestic labour has been reorganised to 
mirror the techniques and the pace dictated by ‘scientific’ management, as first 
applied in the factory. Broadening the scope of what is understood as domestic 
technology, from objects to environments, the application of technological and 
scientific knowledge to the home is especially evident in the field of architecture in 
the particular case of the Frankfurt Kitchen. Designed by Margarete Schütte-Lihotzky 
in 1926, the Frankfurt Kitchen can be seen as part of a wider movement in Germany 
at the time to Taylorise the housewife and to rationalise the working-class home. 
Despite being a communist activist, Lihotzky followed Taylor’s studies of workflows 
in factories and offices that aimed to make them more efficient, and considered that 
the same method could be applied to work in the home. The design for the Frankfurt 
Kitchen, was driven by a rationale to use as little space as possible`, and making a 
woman’s movements in the kitchen minimal and compact.34  
 
This drive for domestic modernisation found support from a range of diverse parties 
and agendas: to feminists, it was seen as means of relief from drudgery and a 
recognition of domestic labour; for industrialists, she explains, it was seen as a 
means to make the workforce more productive, and for unions seen as part of a 
modern, progressive future.35 Yet as historians Susan Henderson and Mary Nolan 
separately note, the act of modernising the home did not liberate women’s time, with 
the benefits going “first and foremost to others- husbands, children, industry and the 
national economy, the political party and the state.”36 Henderson argued that ideas 
around domesticity in the Weimar republic at that time were a significant aspect of 
the retrenchment of feminism (and part of being a good German housewife).37 Noting 
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that there was nothing sentimental about ideas of the home here, the household was 
seen as part of a national economy and therefore subjected to the same rules and 
analysis. Crucially, the domestic was not seen as separate sphere, but rather 
became subject to the pervasive “[adoption of] the language of production.”38  
 
The time saved by an appliance or the application of ‘scientific knowledge’ to 
domestic processes to increase quality and save time was never for women’s own 
leisure or development.  Thus, a significant lesson that we can learn from the history 
of feminist critiques of domestic automation specifically, is that the very definition of 
what counts as undesirable work and what counts as desirable work is always 
already at stake in the development of new technologies, and that the focus on the 
technological component which is the starting point of analysis for many post-work 
enthusiasts remains partial to a key political component, which is the use of time. 
 
A forth significant strand of feminist critiques of domestic technology, made by Susan 
May Strasser amongst others, is the resulting individualisation of domestic labour 
that previously had a social dimension.39  The observation that technology 
reorganises agency and tasks socially, remains relevant today, and as in the case of 
the Frankfurt Kitchen, “each household and each housewife was to be rationalised, 
but unlike in industry, each would perform all tasks.”40 So unlike the factory, labour is 
not fragmented, but multiple tasks became undertaken individually in isolation, with 
women effectively self-managing or self-Taylorising. This isolation was not only tied 
to the introduction of the new appliances, designed and manufactured to be installed 
in individual homes, but combined with a political outlook that valorised individual 
productivity as a mark of social standing for the housewife. To realise how different 
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political views of social time and rest for women would have resulted in a different 
planning, one can turn for comparison to the mass housing projects constructed at a 
similar time in Vienna described by Eve Blau, which experimented instead with 
collectivisation of domestic technologies for working class women.41  
 
As a counterpoint to the Frankfurt Kitchen, individual dwellings in the new mass 
housing in Vienna also had taylorised ‘WohnKuche’, but the city was also concerned 
with the collective and public spaces of the houses, including the provision of 
collective domestic spaces. Images publicising the projects shows these spaces in 
operation and highlights them as sites for innovative technologies - such as steam 
powered washing machines, steam irons, electric dryers - that would not be 
otherwise available at the scale of individual dwellings.42 The illustrations of 
individual interiors, Blau notes, show families at leisure, with girls in particular shown 
“as engaged in intellectual pursuits: reading, studying, lost in thought.”43 The 
efficiencies afforded by the architectural design and new technologies would enable 
girls and women to use their time for their own study and greater participation in 
political life, where “the new political and economic life of the proletarian city was to 
be shaped not in the private space, but in the public and communal space provided 
in the new buildings.”44  Although the collective laundry rooms and ironing rooms 
were still accompanied by problematic gender assumptions that left wider divisions 
of labour unchallenged, yet they prefigured a different path to overcome the isolation 
of housewifery and participated in an imaginary of free time as self-determined but 
as socially embedded. 
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The domestic as the site of this private enjoyment of time is thus in need of analysis 
and unpacking here. As the history of domestic automation and feminism has more 
generally demonstrated, this privatised notion of time produces subjectivities that are 
atomised and confined into practices of consumption at best, or might suffer 
isolation, psychological distress (brought about by isolation, rather than solitude) and 
social stigma at worse.  
As a recent report on the reduction of working time summarises,  
 
the added value of time is abstract and the added value of time is, to a large 
extent, collectively determined [...] Depending on the free time of your peers, 
your own free time will be more or less valuable.45 
 
In this respect, post-work scenarios that emphasize the role of technologies in 
freeing up time or that simply embrace personal inclinations as a driver for leisure 
remain insufficient, insofar as they under conceptualize the problem of free time as 
something to be enjoyed in private, rather than as something that needs to be 
collectively assigned meaning and value, even (perhaps mostly) when it might be 
spent in activities involving self-care.  
 
 
In concluding this brief excursus, today feminist criticism of technology in the home is 
coming to terms with the questions raised by the automation of objects in the home, 
improperly termed the Internet of Things (IoT).  In looking at the discourses used to 
promote such new automated and connected domestic technologies, the tendencies 
identified in feminist scholarship that surrounded earlier moments of innovation in the 
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home, seem to continue unabashed. Domestic automation, devices and spaces, 
from the robot-vacuum cleaner and ‘Effie’ the automatic ironing robot to self-cleaning 
glass, the self-cleaning oven, or the fridge that will order your shopping for you, are 
examples of technologies whose stated aim is to reduce maintenance work, to 
reduce social reproduction. In new ‘smart’ home, appliances are presented as 
allowing their users a greater capacity for ‘multi-tasking’ and productivity through 
time saving, a promise that is not so far removed from their Victorian counterparts 
[insert images]. Thus, the multiplication of tasks; the redistribution of labour and 
changing expectations; increased consumption labour and increasing dependence 
on both public and private infrastructures, remain just as relevant and visible. 
Similarly, the spread of these new forms of domestic innovation will be just as 
uneven through its contingency on accessibility of digital communication networks. 
 
The ghost of scientific management and its panoptical preoccupation with total 
overview and control of the worker lingers on. Recent enquiries are bringing to light 
how digital appliances can become new tools of domestic violence and abuse. For 
example, ex-partners, jealous husbands or dominant fathers can now control the 
family passwords and use devices to survey their kin’s activities and movements. In 
other cases, landlords have been reported using smart home technologies to directly 
monitor their tenants, using the data collected to punish or drive away unwanted 
renters.46 
 
Moreover, mirroring the considerations of Kleinberg, Schwartz Cowan and Shove, 
the distribution or adoption of a few technologies in everyday life never happens 
simultaneously, and this coincides with a relative impoverishment and a social 
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stigmatization of those excluded. As it happened at the times of the uneven 
electrification of different districts, also today when thinking of our relation with digital 
infrastructures, we shall not forget that, as Ursula Huws put it, “so many features of 
social and economic life are designed on the assumption that everyone now has 
these new commodities that survival without them becomes ever more difficult.”47 
The relationship between product adoption and infrastructures continues to be highly 
visible with new digital technologies, so that as it happened for the fridge, it is not 
necessarily the most useful technologies that become wide spread, but the one 
which are backed by the biggest capital interests. The profits at stake around 
technological products and their networks remain to such an extent that Ursula Huws 
speaks of contemporary “tithes”, such as those mobile phone companies profiting 
from our social lives every time we send an SMS or those small charges incurred 
when we use a debit or credit card.48 The utility networks, such as electricity, which 
enabled the proliferation of household technology in the early 1900s, or today’s 
digital infrastructures of wireless communication both share common ground in that 
they represent a deepening of the commodification of everyday life and social 
relations, via increasing dependencies of private and municipal infrastructures that 
can only be accessed via the wage relation. 
 
Considerations on how digital tools and networked appliances can become vehicles 
for new/old forms of domestic violence, and the realisation that today’s digital 
infrastructures can embed new/old forms of class discrimination and wage 
dependency into households are simply two entry point into a much vaster enquiry 
into the role of digitalisation in reshaping the politics and imaginaries of domestic 
dwelling. While this task is beyond our focus here, what we believe is that revisiting 
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feminist materialist critique of technologies in the home can contribute to current 
research into post-work theories, challenging the assumption, couched in many 
mainstream debates around post-work (as opposed to anti-work) where deliverance 
from labour is though as being intrinsic to the adoption of certain technologies 
themselves.  
 
The assumptions around the impacts of technologies on patterns of work cut across 
both right- and left-wing positions, which assume that the problem lies either within 
the technology itself or as a problem of its management, ownership and governance. 
The feminist critique we revisited in these pages, instead, highlights how 
considerations of the characteristics of the technologies themselves must be seen as 
enmeshed together with evolving practices, cultural norms and wider urban 
infrastructures. The societal impact of technological change therefore operates 
across public and private spheres, complicating their inter-relationships and 
dependencies. What this presents is a serious challenge for technologies to be 
appropriated or refused in the name of emancipation from work. 
 
Keeping all of this in mind, what remains to do for expanding our critique, then, is to 
also look at how materialist feminists proposed a different approach to the problem 
with work by rethinking not only the critique of the domestic as coinciding with the 
sphere of the private, but also by looking at the alternative types of domestic 
technologies feminist collectivities could (self) produce for their own reproduction. 
 
 
Domestic Revolutions, grand and small 
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Feminist criticism of home automation not only offers a sharp analysis of 
techno-solutionism, but also allows us to weave another minor and valuable story to 
build an anti-worker imaginary. It is a genealogy that tells the role of feminism in 
reconfiguring the domestic and its technologies in a radically different manner 
starting from the question of the division of spaces and work times. One of the most 
significant contributions to this analysis comes from the architectural historian and 
theorist Dolores Hayden, whose seminar work The Grand Domestic Revolution is a 
minor but powerful story that elaborates how women's rejection of work has 
generated its own technological policy.49 In the tradition of feminist materialist 
initiatives that have tried to reorganize and rethink what the domestic might look like 
if not privatised, Hayden’s careful construction and analysis of this US genealology 
surveys and revisits the many experimentations of collectivization of domestic life 
that took place there between the 1890s-1920s.  She shows how these experimental 
practices of collective co-habitation were guided by a feminist critique of the 
organization of social reproduction that generated many technological innovations, 
which were advanced for their times, noting a whole range of new invention 
including: 
 
special insulation and ventilation 
gas lights, 
steam baths, 
steam heat  
an improved washing machine; 
the common clothespin;  
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a double rolling pin for faster pastry making;  
a conical stove to heat flatirons;  
the flat broom;  
removable window sash, for easy washing;  
a window-sash balance;  
a round oven for more even cooking;  
a rotating oven shelf for removing items more easily;  
a butter worker;  
a cheese press;  
a pea sheller;  
an apple peeler;  
an apple parer which quartered and cored the fruit; 
a lazy susan dining-table center,  
an improved mop wringer,  
an improved washing machine; 
an institutional-scale potato peeler; 
large cradles which could hold as many as six children; 
specially designed furniture at child scale; 
‘Community Playthings’, 
extensive landscaped play spaces.50 
 
What is remarkable is the length of the list of innovations Hayden references, 
demonstrating the domestic not as a recipient of innovative, industrial technology but 
creator of technology designed for collective convivial life. Interestingly, discussing 
these vernacular, autonomous technologies, Hayden points out that these women 
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“rather than being on call day and night, like the average wife and mother” did have 
the leisure to cultivate “their other interests such as reading, writing, participating in 
musical or theatrical performances, developing friendships, enjoying amorous 
relationships.”51 The domestic in the feminist and socialist communities above, 
becomes the locus of the technological revolution rather than its passive recipient  - 
a question that will reopen many years later Shulamith Firestone in her call for a 
feminist development and appropriation of reproductive technologies52 - rejecting any 
simplistic re-appropriative approach to the technological problem, that is, the 
hypothesis that it is enough to regain possession of the existing technological 
apparatus to guarantee the possibility of their different political use.53  
 
The collective development of technology in Hayden’s work is in sharp contrast to 
the technologies mentioned above, such as the Frankfurt Kitchen. As Henderson’s 
account helps to unravel, its design was firmly within the context of a state policy of 
“female re-domestication”, with the retrenchment of feminism occurring with high-rate 
of joblessness post-war.54 The crisis of male work and the rise of female employment 
resulted not in greater equality, but instead on aggrandising “the status for woman’s 
sphere”, a trend witnessed in more recent right-wing agendas.55 In the case of the 
Frankfurt kitchen, the domestic sphere was bolstered “as the ideological equivalent 
to male professions”56 which was to be achieved  by making it more like the (male) 
workplace with scientific rationale and technologies. The contrast of this example 
with the collective domestic technologies, highlights the connection between the 
refusal of work and the refusal of the domestic. The question of the relationship 
between ‘spheres’ of production and social reproduction needs to be seen as a 
division produced by capitalism, where social reproduction constitutes an 
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epistemological standpoint to reflect upon the relation between living labour and 
capital across different social spaces. As Marx already said, “every social process of 
production is, at the same time, a process of reproduction.”57 Thus, the technology in 
the home is a terrain of struggle between the domestic as a site of the mere 
subsistence of the labourer or ground for generating autonomy in the name of 
pleasure or self-determination. 
 
A compelling line of inquiry in this direction which we want to put forward draws on 
the work of American historian of technology, Rachel Maines, who retraced 
technologies developed specifically for enjoyment. The author, made famous by her 
research on the vibrator, in her book Hedonizing Technologies focused instead on 
the relationship between machines and pleasure in a different key, investigating the 
principles that guide the development of technologies related to amateurism, leisure, 
hobbies and all those activities that pertain to free time.58 Her studies explain how 
technologies become ‘hedonizing’ with respect to their practices of use whenever 
they have been abandoned in their productive capacity, but have managed to 
survive and enjoy a second life as tools used for amateur purposes.  Maines shows 
that users’ values and requirements in terms of what they seek from their 
technologies, have radically different material qualities and purpose than their 
original design intended, and indeed that these values re-shape the very 
functionalities of the devices at stake. 
 
The amateur activities taken into consideration and the corresponding technologies 
reveal themselves to be very different in nature (ranging from crochet or ‘extreme 
ironing’ to amateur airplane flying), thus excluding the possibility that there may be 
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intrinsic pleasure in a given practice. Instead, the emphasis is placed onto the 
material and historical conditions in which these activities take place as leisure. The 
technologies involved in these enjoyment processes gradually undergo mutations to 
respond to the need for satisfaction immanent in the activity itself, rather than 
dictated by a certain productivity threshold. What Maines’ insight points towards is 
that these technological adaptations are themselves variegated, disobeying any 
assumption about the inevitability of technological development: enthusiasts 
sometimes try to recreate an immediate experience and prefer more primitive 
technical tools than those commonly used; but at other times, satisfaction comes 
from experimentation with sophisticated technological tools or even hacked ones. In 
both cases, however, the relationship with technologies seems to confirm that 
practices of pleasure are linked to the possibility of re-skilling - that is the 
development of new skills, faculties, skills and knowledge - in a protected regime, 
without too many costs or social risks: the domestic sphere here can be seen as a 
temporary and partial shelter where interaction with technology only constitutes a 
step in the development of counter- life techniques. 
 
The feminist genealogy we outlined above are just two highlights among the many 
that are needed to create more complex feminist and anti-workerist political 
imaginaries, able to draw deep and meaningful relations between the refusal of work 
to the rejection of normalized domesticity - understood either as the place of family, 
of total personal freedom or of consumption. These examples also allows us to 
reflect by contrast on the techno-political mechanisms that are reshaping the 
relationship between the social body the technologies according to a paradigm that 
can be defined as “technological domestication,” that is, a paradigm that expands the 
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characteristics of labour in the home - invisibilization, informality, moralisation and 
servilism, to the entirety of relations.59 Finally, the feminist reflection on the 
technologies of the domestic calls for the qualitative aspect of the policies of 
enjoyment of common time; the role of consumption as a productive activity and of 
use as an important element of subjectivization, questioning the problematic 
hypothesis of re-appropriation in an emancipatory sense of existing technological 
infrastructures. Their standpoint also offers a viable methodological blueprint for 
moving away from a Kantian conception of technology understood “as an 
anthropological universal” towards its recasting as a plural entity, what Yuk Hui 
called a world of “multiple cosmotechniques,”60 where each technology is understood 
as being simultaneously generative of and constrained by specific life-worlds.  
 
What a feminist critique of automation allows us to think about also adds another 
immediately political value to the problem, because it puts the accent not so much on 
the possible ‘post-’scenario, but on the processes that would allow the transition to 
such scenario in the first place, emerging from a range of social forms as 
interconnected components of a totality. While autonomous Marxist’s take on the 
refusal of work has been at the centre of much influential debates and critical 
analysis in the last twenty years at least, feminist criticism of the technologization of 
the domestic has much to offer to today’s project of moving the anti-work horizon 
centerstage for left politics. It might allow us to shift our gaze from considering 
technologies in their immediately productive role, to consider them instead as 
components of a broader infrastructure that always reproduces, as well as being 
productive of, their own cosmologies.  
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